Jared Emry

[Hans] Driesch defined a machine as “a typical configuration of physical and chemical constituents, by the acting of which a typical effect is attained” (102). The main issue with Driesch’s definition is the question of what typical means, because the difference between typical and atypical is the basic distinction within the definition. Additionally, all his proofs lie on this line between typical and atypical as set by the definition. Dictionary.com defines typical as “pertaining to, of the nature of, or serving as a type or emblem; symbolic.”

Driesch makes the argument that because life can have relatively atypical results, it cannot be mechanistic in nature. One of the atypical results is cells can be transplanted from one region that will develop into organ A to another region that will develop into organ B and yet both organs will still be formed properly. Another atypical result is cells can similarly be implanted, but from another related species and those cells will still allow the first creature to form its organs while the cells remain uniquely the same. A third atypical result is the organism grows despite the external pressure placed on it to prevent it from forming in the required three dimensional space typically thought to be needed.  This is atypical because a machine typically acts in regard to three dimensional space and has to be constructed in regard to three dimensional space and thus cannot have function at right angles to that plane.

There are two kinds of possible definitions for typical in the context of Driesch’s definition of a machine: a mathematical definition and a practical definition. The difference between the two options is predictive identifiability versus the possibility of absolute variable cognition. Predictive identifiability is the idea typicality is based on major traits that can be known in such a way as to perceive the most likely outcomes. Typicality, based upon a predictive identifiability definition, would be the use of variables of greater hamegin (perception of having relative influence on a given outcome) to analyze probable outcomes while combining the variables of lesser hamegin into a statistical average based on observations. The possibility of absolute variable cognition is the idea that typicality is the standard all relevant variables can be known well enough to create a formula that allows all possible outcomes to be known based on the inputs of all the relevant variables. In this form, typicality refers to all possible outcomes associated with necessarily anything and to be atypical would be to be unnatural. Also, the possibility of absolute variable cognition is not necessarily practical due to the difficulty of manipulating variables and the possibility the variables can’t be cognitively understood. The practical definition refers to predictive identifiability, whereas the mathematical definition refers to the possibility of absolute variable cognition. Driesch’s usage of typicality seems to be more closely related to the former rather than the latter. Essentially, Driesch’s concept of Entelechia could be seen as covering up the minor and relatively unknown or unknowable variables with a constant; it may not be the most precise or accurate way to describe any given biological entity, but it allows for identifiable outcomes to be predicted.

The use of the possibility of absolute variable cognition as the standard for typicality in Driesch’s definition is at best a topicality violation or at worst a strawman fallacy. Driesch is not directly implicating the supernatural in his theory and is still using the word “typical.” If he were to mean the word “typical” with a possibility of absolute variable cognition kind of definition, then he wouldn’t have to even use the word “typical” because it would be redundant. His description of how life responds in an atypical way also shows how there is distinction to be made in the natural world between typical and atypical. The only option that remains is typicality as predictive identifiability.

The use of predictive identifiability in Driesch’s definition of a machine must be applied to discern what is typical and what isn’t. While Driesch does not claim Entelechia is supernatural, he does make it apparent it is unknowable on certain levels; a distinction is made between the ability of the human to know Entelechia and the reality of Entelechia. Similarly, even if the functionality and causality of Entelechia is known, it still does not necessitate absolute variable cognition. It would still require the knowledge of how each and every variable interact in order to create each possible outcome. If such knowledge is beyond human compression, the use of predictive identifiability is a must. These distinctions are more than enough to create the need for distinct classifications. What is beyond human capability cannot be equally regarded with that which is within. According to Driesch’s definition, there cannot be a machine that is unknowable for a machine must always produce typical outcomes relative to known inputs. At the moment a machine can produce an atypical outcome, it can’t be classified properly as a machine. In this way, biologic entities cannot be considered to be mechanistic because it is impossible to know the entirety of life’s causalities, functions, and outcomes. The definition does not require that something that isn’t a machine is life; other options may include inanimate objects, a planet, or the universe.

The machine is classified by its definition based primarily upon the possibility of human comprehension in regards to a set of variables interacting in a three-dimensional space. Driesch’s idea of a machine does not require a concept such as Entelechia because it is fully knowable; the machine can have absolute variable cognition.

Works Cited

Driesch, Hans. The Science and Philosophy of the Organism; the Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of Aberdeen in the Year 1907. London: A. and C. Black, 1908. Print.

“Typical.” Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com, n.d. Web. 20 Oct. 2014.