Erik Lang
Shock rippled through his body; instantly he knew he was hit. His leg looked like it had been severed almost completely off just above the knee. Staff Sergeant John Wayne Walding fired his weapon a few more times and began to attend to his knee. He quickly formed a tourniquet around his leg to stem the flow of blood gushing out of the stump. His leg was “flopping around,” so Walding folded his leg up parallel to his thigh and tied it in place. While trying to inject his leg with morphine, he slipped and stuck his thumb by accident. “Well, now my thumb feels pretty good,” he remarked to his fellow soldiers, which brought a chorus of laughs in the grim situation. Without immediate access to a medical facility, Staff Sgt. Walding held his position and continued to fight the terrorists that outnumbered them.
This incredible account of Staff Sgt. Walding is completely true, verified by his peers on the battlefield with him. Within this engagement, vast numbers of insurgents assaulted the joint Special Operations Forces unit. Men just like Walding fought for many hours without relief in unfamiliar territory. Not a single American SOF member was killed. To fight back against a large enemy in their territory for hours requires impeccable skill and courage, both qualities embodied within Special Operations Forces. Accounts like this prompt my thesis: to provide more government funding for the training, production, and use of Special Operations Forces.
Throughout this thesis are several terms or acronyms used some people have never heard before. They are used to simplify the words the acronyms stand for. SOF stands for Special Operations Forces and refers to every military branch’s special unit. Spec. Ops. is used interchangeably with SOF. Irregular Warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (Baseops). This means our military cannot engage insurgencies in open battle as war has been previously conducted in wars past. The enemy is not clothed or endorsed explicitly by any government, making open confrontation with them difficult and tedious. The military now incorporates methods revolving around reconnaissance, covert missions, and ways of engaging the enemy without the convenience of always knowing who or where the insurgencies are. IEDs are Improvised Explosive Devices and are one of the most frequent ways insurgents inflict casualties.
The history of American SOF began in the mid 1700s during the French and Indian War between France and England. Lt. Col. Robert Rodgers commanded a group of American militiamen to fight against the French using methods similar to what the Indians used, involving stealthy ambushes and fighting and traversing in rough terrain unfamiliar to French soldiers. This unconventional way of fighting was the beginning of the idea of SOF tactics (Couch 1). In every war America has been engaged in since, the use of special groups like “Rodger’s Rangers” that performed feats beyond those of ordinary soldiers has become more prevalent. In the War for American Independence, Francis Marion conducted daring raids on British camps in the swamps of South Carolina and Georgia. In the Civil War, Colonel John Mosby led a group of volunteers behind Union lines and regularly conducted surprise attacks on supply lines and enemy soldiers. He earned the nickname the “Grey Ghost” (25). However, it wasn’t until World War II when the idea behind modern SOF began to take shape.
The Germans had their own groups of commandos that had devastating effects on Allied Forces. In response, America’s William “Wild Bill” Donovan formed the OSS, or Office of Strategic Services, with the permission of President Franklin Roosevelt. “Donovan trained them in parachuting, sabotage, silent killing, communications, and a host of behind-the-lines disciplines, including the recruitment and training of indigenous resistance forces” (29). This is almost identical with what modern day SOF has become, especially in regards to training indigenous resistance fighters. The OSS operated mostly in the European theater, working in the countries of Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. OSS worked behind German lines as saboteurs and intelligence gatherers and was a major contributing factor in helping end the war. In the Pacific theater, the OSS also had great success, particularly in Burma. OSS instructors helped organize Kachin and Karen rebels into an organized fighting force of 15,000 that wreaked havoc upon Japanese soldiers, killing thousands and wrecking crucial supply lines. With the dissolution of the OSS after the war, many former employees began working for the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Among them was William Donovan. He worked closely with two veterans of World War II: Colonel Russell Volkmann and Colonel Aaron Bank, both of whom had extensive experience with the OSS. This triumvirate made the nucleus of the modern day CIA.
During the Vietnam War and the military actions taken in El Salvador, the CIA operated closely with the military, perfecting their use of SOF. In both of these military actions, SOF was instrumental in using its tactics and training to fight off Communist aggressors and train and equip the locals to fight the enemy. After World War II and through Vietnam, input from other countries like England further assisted America in her growth of SOF. Years of warfare have strengthened SOF to become the deadly, efficient fighting and instructing force it is today.
Today, the new enemy is terrorism, in whatever form it takes. America is battling insurgencies around the globe, giving SOF credibility to help America adapt to the style of Irregular Warfare. With the knowledge of fighting terrorist groups and infiltrating enemy lines, SOF is needed in today’s war more than ever.
I will prove how SOF needs more government funding to put more soldiers in the field by clearly demonstrating SOF is the most effective and efficient type of soldier (better qualified to combat Irregular Warfare than basic military units), is thoroughly successful in missions, and plays a large part in the War on Terror and would have an even greater impact with proper funding. Arguments against extra funding for SOF are the assertions they are uncontrollable, ineffective, and fiscally irresponsible due to the uniqueness of SOF compared to standard infantry units.
Irregular warfare is a type of combat that involves countering insurgencies and guerrilla militias with precision strikes usually in isolated engagements. The difference between traditional warfare and irregular warfare are the enemy and the strategies associated with fighting against them. Traditional warfare was army against army, country against country. The enemy was well known, specific to a country, and marked by uniforms of that country. With irregular warfare, the enemy lives among the innocent, blending in with societies eliminating open warfare as an option for confrontation. Currently, the war on terror is fought against insurgencies like the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, which blend in with cultures and societies and attack American forces in isolated skirmishes and ambushes. “Irregular warfare is emerging as a dominant form of warfare for the future. Yet irregular warfare, at its root, contains many of the characteristics found on today’s battlefront in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)” (Cannady 4). With irregular warfare fast becoming the normal form of war, it is critical for America to adapt and effectively combat such insurgencies. An adapting style of war calls for a special breed of soldier: a soldier that is highly effective, skilled, and enduring. This breed of soldier is found in American Special Operations Forces.
America’s military is comprised of four branches of service: the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force. Each of these services has its own group(s) of special operation forces. These higher trained and qualified forces are superior to standard military units, given the nature of Irregular Warfare. Simply put, these basic units are incapable of effectively completing missions in the War on Terror, making funding for soldiers that are effective and capable for this type of war imperative. The Army has three different groups of Spec. Ops. They are the Army Rangers, the Green Berets, and Delta Force. The “Ranger Regiment is a flexible, highly-trained, and rapidly-deployable light infantry force with specialized skills that enables it to be employed against a variety of conventional and special operations targets.… They generally practice to parachute into the middle of the action, to perform strikes and ambushes and to capture enemy airfields” (Powers 2). The Army Rangers are a more trained group of infantry than the basic grunts. They pride themselves on being first in the fight in any firefight. They aren’t the Spec. Ops. Soldiers that wear camouflage face paint and night vision goggles, but they go through an intensive training course, hardening them for heavier, direct combat. The Army’s Green Beret (Special Forces) soldiers’ primary job is instruction. These are the soldiers America sends to aid foreign countries in properly training their military. Given the nature of their job, Special Forces (SF) personnel must be fluent in at least one other foreign language, preferably two or three. SF are incredibly effective in communicating with natives in countries, which provides them with the ability to penetrate enemy territory and conduct reconnaissance missions providing intelligence to command centers in friendly territory. This knowledge base gives SF superior reasoning capabilities and insight into a foreign country’s unresolved issues, providing valuable assistance to the leaders of any country. Every SF member is required to possess these skills, something not seen within basic infantry units. SF’s efficiency when it comes to foreign relations is much higher to the alternative basic Army infantry. Direct action and counter-insurgency are also part of SF’s job description. Finally for the Army Special Operations is the Delta Force, the group least thought of when Spec. Ops. is mentioned. Delta operates mainly on a classified level, often working in conjunction with organizations like the C.I.A.
Back in 1977, when hi-jacking aircraft and taking hostages seemed to be the “in thing,” an Army Special Forces officer, Colonel Charles Beckwith, returned from a special assignment with the British Special Air Service (SAS), with a unique idea. He sold the idea of a highly-trained military hostage-rescue force, patterned after the SAS, to the head-honchos at the Pentagon, and they approved (4).
Delta Force is rumored to have its own fleet of helicopters painted with civilian colors in order not to draw attention. The main objective of Delta Force today is to be the silent resolvers. If there is an incident developing America can’t officially get involved in, then Delta Force is sent to get in and out without alerting anyone to America’s presence. At least, that’s what the rumors are. The Army infantry doesn’t have the proper training to accomplish what Delta can. Delta’s effectiveness in these precarious situations is evidenced in unclassified missions during the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Navy’s Spec. Ops. Group is the now famous SEALS. SEALS are trained for land, sea, and air assaults. These men are required to pass the rigorous Basic Underwater Demolition/SEALS (BUDS) course, which is a six-month long, physically grueling selection and assessment program. One section of BUDS is “Hell Week,” where the candidates must participate in physical activities almost constantly for six straight days in a sleep-deprived state (allowed only 4 to 5 hours of sleep). The SEALS’ most valuable contribution is underwater and amphibious assaults partnered with demolitions expertise. No other SOF groups, especially basic military units, are trained to combat Irregular Warfare as effectively as SEALS. They are trained in every type of environment and go through countless scenarios of missions. They are also the only group to actively train for conflicts in arctic or subzero conditions. SEALS thrive in aquatic environments, and their superior physical capabilities make their missions near flawless.
The United States Air Force has two different Spec. Ops. groups: the Air Force Pararescue Jumpers (or PJs) and the Air Force Combat Controllers. “‘These things we do, that others may live.’ That’s the official motto of Air Force Pararescue. If you have an aircrew member down in enemy territory, wounded or not, you can’t get anyone better to pull him/her out of there than Air Force Pararescue” (6). PJs are responsible for responding to military personnel in distress quickly and transporting them to safety, and if necessary, fight off enemy hostiles harassing those in need. PJs are required to have an extensive knowledge of medicines and treatments for any type of abrasion to the body and be able to treat the wounds in the field, while airborne, or even under fire. Training for these soldiers lasts roughly a year, preparing them for almost every rescue scenario known. Air Force Combat Controllers are soldiers who operate makeshift air traffic control towers in the field very close to enemy positions. Their responsibility is to sneak into hostile territory, direct air traffic during missions, and then sneak back out without detection. They are, of course, trained to react accordingly to defend against hostiles if they are discovered.
Marine Corps Force Recon is the final Spec. Ops. group. They only recently joined the Spec. Ops. umbrella but have made great contributions to the SOF community and in missions like Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Force Recon team is trained to conduct pre- and post-mission reconnaissance of the target location(s), advising Marines and other assaulting forces on the terrain, number of hostiles, etc. Among the Marine Corps Force Recon men are the Marine snipers, highly qualified and trained separately in the Marine Recon sniper school.
The training for each of these Special Operations groups is long, intensive, and extremely difficult, physically and more so mentally. The SOF soldier must be able to overcome all odds thrown against him by neutralizing the enemy, complete the assigned mission, and fall asleep with a clean conscience … then wake up the following day and do it all over again. To live this lifestyle is taxing on the mind and must be lived by only those who are mentally sound. Those who crack under pressure are quickly weeded out during SOF recruitment and testing.
The training courses are designed specifically to each group and their specialties, but elements similar in each group’s training program are the emphasis on physical taxation. Physical Testing (PT) is every day, all day. Punishments are given in the form of more running, sit ups, pushups, or whatever the instructors decide. Physical fitness is mandatory, and those who fail to pass this qualification are quickly weeded out and sent home. Communicating and acting as a team is critical to the execution of Spec. Ops. missions. Numerous exercises and leadership reaction drills enforce the idea no one man can successfully operate by himself. The team itself must work together in order to achieve perfection in execution. These thorough and taxing training programs cannot be done by standard soldiers. Special Operations Forces live up to their name; they are special. Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror cannot be fought effectively by standard military troops. They aren’t trained nearly as well as SOF. This simple truth calls for more government resources to be dedicated toward SOF programs to take the fight to the enemy and keep Americans free from terror.
The quality of the soldiers from the Special Operations Forces breed are exceptional. The contrast between the regular soldiers on tour and the Spec. Ops. warrior leaves a chasm of experience, training, and success. The Special Forces Creed succinctly states the mindset of the SOF warrior:
I am an American Special Forces Soldier! I will do all that my nation requires of me. I am a volunteer, knowing well the hazards of my profession. I serve with the memory of those who have gone before me. I pledge to uphold the honor and integrity of their legacy in all that I am — in all that I do. I am a warrior. I will teach and fight whenever and wherever my nation requires. I will strive always to excel in every art and artifice of war. I know that I will be called upon to perform tasks in isolation, far from familiar faces and voices. With the help and guidance of my faith, I will conquer my fears and succeed. I will keep my mind and body clean, alert and strong. I will maintain my arms and equipment in an immaculate state befitting a Special Forces Soldier, for this is my debt to those who depend upon me. I will not fail those with whom I serve. I will not bring shame upon myself or Special Forces. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I will never surrender though I am the last. If I am taken, I pray that I have the strength to defy my enemy. I am a member of my Nation’s chosen soldiery, I serve quietly, not seeking recognition or accolades. My goal is to succeed in my mission — and live to succeed again. De Oppresso Liber (North 4).
Simply put, Special Operations Forces are better at confronting terrorism through Irregular Warfare. They are self-motivated and encouraged by their peers to live the words of the creed.
This drive and passion led to their effectiveness during missions. In Operation “Chromium,” the objective of the joint U.S. Special Forces and Iraqi commandos was to take down an insurgent kingpin named Abu Obaeideah with his followers in Samarra, Iraq on the 10th of September, 2007. Up to this mission, the SF unit had been training the Iraqi commandos with SOF techniques to better defend their own country. Operation “Chromium” provided the perfect live action scenario to put the Iraqis’ practice to the test. Reliable intelligence pinpointed Abu’s location in Samarra. He and about 10 to 12 other insurgents were inside a small farming compound comprised of several buildings. The raid took place at night, and three U.S. SF operators (Staff Sgt Halbisengibbs, Sgt 1st Class Lindsay, and Capt Chaney) led the assault as supervision. Black Hawk helicopters carried the U.S. and Iraqi teams separately. When the American chopper tried to land at the designated Landing Zone (LZ), the surface was filled with water prompting the pilot to set down closer to the target buildings. The closer landing alerted the hostiles to the Americans’ presence. The Iraqis were too far away to help, so the three SF operators did the only natural thing: continue the mission alone. They systematically and quickly swept the first building, clearing it of hostiles until they entered the second house, where the bulk of the insurgents were. Each Green Beret sustained injuries while killing the hostiles, but they proved victorious and killed Abu Obaeideah with a quick three-round burst. The mission was a complete success, providing the fledgling Iraqi commandos with a prime example of the effectiveness of SOF. All three SF soldiers were awarded medals for their courage (the Distinguished Service Cross and two Silver Stars). Operation “Chromium” is one of many missions SOF have been involved with, including other operations like “Vigilant Resolve” and “Awakening,” where SOF battled enemies that vastly outnumbered them and emerged victorious.
Right now, America is leading the charge against the War on Terror. Within the American effort against terrorism, no military group is used more heavily than SOF. Their success is unparalleled by any other military unit world-wide, but their contribution comes at a price. SOF resources are stretched thin, and men within these special groups are often deployed at least six months out of every year. “When it comes to equipment, aircraft, intelligence, and other support, they say, they don’t get their fair share. As one senior Special Forces officer put it: ‘We have a world-class capability for direct action. We need the same world-class, well-resourced capability to do unconventional warfare’” (Robinson 2). Unconventional warfare is the same as Irregular Warfare. The soldiers within the Special Operations community do the brunt of the fighting because the war is exactly what they trained for. The only problem is there are not many of these soldiers, so often it is the same men completing all the missions time after time, year-round. With increased funding better facilities, increased access to weapons and aircraft support and SOF intelligence will all be more available to SOF, increasing missions completed each year. Even government officials are starting to take notice of the power of SOF. Rep. Jim Saxton, the chairman of the special operations subcommittee, while praising direct-action successes, says, “I believe the key to our military efforts rests in the unconventional capabilities. It is vital that policy makers in the Department of Defense not lose sight of the strategic importance of unconventional warfare and ensure that we capitalize on those capabilities” (3).
Three arguments against creating incentives and providing more funding for SOF training and equipment are the assertions SOF are uncontrollable, ineffective and unnecessary, and fiscally irresponsible. These arguments are unsubstantiated and based on faulty premises.
First, the uncontrollable argument maintains SOF are “Pariah Cowboys,” undisciplined and trigger-happy. Trigger-happy describes one who wildly shoots anything that moves. Special Operations Forces are anything but trigger-happy.
One of the hardest of the hard-liners was the group’s chief, Dick Clarke. (Clark’s philosophy was to preemptively attack the terrorists.) Asked if that meant using SOF, he replied: “Oh yeah. In fact, many of the options were with special mission units.” … Such measures worried the senior brass, who proceeded to weaken those officials by treating them (SOF) as pariahs. That meant portraying them as cowboys, who proposed reckless military operations that would get American soldiers killed.… (The officiating generals didn’t like the idea of SOF and attacked Clark.) Some generals had been vitriolic, calling Clarke “a madman, out of control, power hungry, wanted to be a hero, all that kind of stuff.” In fact, one of these former officials emphasized, “when we would carry back from the counterterrorism group one of those SOF counterterrorism proposals, our job was to figure out not how to execute it, but how we were going to say no.” By turning Clarke into a pariah, the Pentagon brass discredited precisely the options that might have spared us the tragedy of September 11, 2001. And when Clarke fought back at being branded “wild” and “irresponsible,” they added “abrasive” and “intolerant” to the counts against him (Shultz).
Clark’s entire philosophy of taking the fight to the terrorist was completely ignored by military officials because of his use of SOF and their skepticism about SOF’s ability to take orders. This prejudiced belief was directly responsible for the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Centers, who could have been stopped sooner if military officials listened to Clark. SOF has the highest success rate out of any military group in the world. The casualty rates comparing standard military forces and SOF is 26 to 2.
Advisor Dick Clarke is often pointed out by bureaucratic military advisors as being extreme and unstable. The reality is Dick Clarke and men like him who serve as SOF are the most obedient soldiers available to America. SOF go through intense training programs where they are only taught how do the job of SOF and are expected to follow every order to the letter. Failure to follow orders during these programs means automatic dismissal from the program, sometimes without the option to even start over (Powers). The notion of uncontrollable SOF is invalidated through the constant training and discipline these men go through. The uncontrollable counter-argument has no base or evidence to support their claims. SOF has creeds and prayers said on a daily basis to reaffirm the type of men they are: intelligent and effective.

The second major counter-argument SOF is ineffective is irrational. When addressing the ineffectiveness of SOF, the incident that usually surfaces is the UN mission in Somalia where “Operation Irene” turned into a deadly 16-hour shootout with hostiles in downtown Mogadishu. SOF members were pinned down and sustained heavy casualties when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu. Since this mistake, SOF trainers and officials have taken great steps forward in the Special Operations department. Better and more intensive training, higher awareness of situations, and increased use and responsibilities have honed SOF into highly effective soldiers. The fight in Mogadishu has given SOF a black eye that quickly healed but was never forgotten by SOF. Every member of SOF knows of Somalia and goes through specific courses designed to ensure the mistakes made there will never be repeated. After this incident in 1993, many Pentagon officials were hesitant about using SOF in any capacity. “Some senior generals had expressed doubts about the Mogadishu operation, yet as it had morphed from a peacekeeping mission into a manhunt for Aidid, the new national security team had failed to grasp the implications. The Mogadishu disaster spooked the Clinton administration as well as the brass, and confirmed the Joint Chiefs in the view that SOF should never be entrusted with independent operations” (Shultz). Since the firefight in Mogadishu, there have been at least 24 successful missions, including Operations “Chromium” and “Vigilant Resolve” during the War on Terror, in which SOF was directly involved and made a significant contribution. These missions involved hunting down terrorist training camps, targeting high profile Taliban/Al-Qaeda leaders, infiltrating and destroying terrorist drug productions, and more (North). The Mogadishu incident was only one mission gone wrong. The talents and benefits SOF bring to America’s military are indispensable and shouldn’t be shoved aside because of one bad mission.
Lastly is the assertion funding and incentives for SOF are fiscally irresponsible and unnecessary, and the funding would be better spent elsewhere in the military or even on programs like government-provided health care. When the safety of America is at risk, other programs such as socialized health care must be put on hold. The government does not, and has never had the responsibility to, provide health care to all citizens according to the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution does say the government has the obligation to protect America’s citizens from all powers both foreign and domestic. The real fiscal irresponsibility would be to provide funding to any program but the Special Operations program. Government funding for the U.S. military was dramatically cut in the beginning of the year 2011. Cutbacks due to the recession cost many in the military their jobs. Congress currently is projecting to cut the military’s overall budget by even more, potentially up to 500 billion dollars. With budget cuts as dramatic as these, America’s military is going to be significantly smaller, thus weakening the defense of America. With America as a super-power turned invalid, other countries won’t hesitate to take advantage of a weakened America and attack. The remaining soldiers guarding our country must be the best of the best, properly trained to fight the changing style of war: Irregular Warfare. Our military must adapt its personnel and tactics in order to not be swept aside by enemies more prepared than America. The soldiers best trained for this warfare are SOF soldiers.
There are many men just like Staff Sgt. Walding, men who will fight until they can’t fight anymore, ready to give their lives in defense of the freedoms we as Americans hold so dear, and more can be similarly trained to follow suit. Through increased funding and incentives for SOF programs, the efficiency and expertise can increase even more to ensure even greater protection and strategic advantages against enemies of America. For your own safety and a desire to see America combat fanatical aggressors, please promote my thesis, to rightly fund more SOF programs to other forms of funding. Our very existence and way of life is at stake.
Works Cited
Baseops. “US Special Operations — Navy SEALs, Delta Force, Special Forces, Army Rangers.” Baseops.net. Web. 12 Dec. 2011.
Cannady, Bryan H. “Irregular Warfare: Special Operations Joint Professional Military Education Transformation.” Thesis. University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2008. Web. 12 Dec. 2011.
Couch, Dick, and Robert D. Kaplan. Chosen Soldier: the Making of a Special Forces Warrior. New York: Crown, 2007.
Martin, Joseph J., and Rex W. Dodson. Get Selected! for Special Forces: How to Successfully Train for and Complete Special Forces Assessment & Selection. Fayetteville, NC: Warrior Mentor, 2006.
North, Oliver, and Chuck Holton. American Heroes in Special Operations. Nashville, TN: Fidelis, 2010.
Powers, Rod. “Special Operations Forces — U.S. Military.” United States Military Information. About.com. U.S. Military, 2011. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
Robinson, Linda. “U.S. Special Forces Are Walking Point in the War on Terror. Here’s Their Plan.” US News & World Report. 3 Sept. 2006. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
SOC. “U.S. Special Operations History.” Special Operations.Com. 2000. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
Southworth, Samuel A. U.S. Special Forces: a Guide to America’s Special Operations Units. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2002.
—. U.S. Special Warfare: the Elite Combat Skills of America’s Modern Armed Forces. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2004.


