Caitlin Montgomery Hubler

The argument from design for the existence of God originally propounded by William Paley, also known as the teleological argument, was long thought to have been refuted by Darwin’s revolutionary theory of evolution by natural selection.  However, in recent years, a new form of this argument has arisen.  Instead of focusing on specific instances of apparent purposive design, this argument seeks to emphasize what biologist Thomas Huxley referred to as “wider teleology” (“Darwin”).  Although Huxley was himself a staunch evolutionist, sometimes even referred to as “Darwin’s bulldog” (“Briefly Noted”), he nevertheless admitted there exists a teleology left untouched by evolution (“Darwin”).  “Wider teleology” emphasizes the necessary conditions for the existence of a universe that could even theoretically permit intelligent life in the first place.  It is this “wider teleological” argument that leads me to the conclusion God exists.

In recent years, the scientific community has been stunned by the sheer amount of complexity and sensitivity of the conditions necessary for the origin and evolution of life on earth.  In order for intelligent carbon-based life to even have the possibility of existing, it is dependent upon a delicate balance of both physical and cosmological factors.  For example, scientist G. J. Withrow found in 1955 life would be possible only in a universe with exactly three dimensions (“Teleological Argument”).  Our laws of chemistry and physics are entirely dependent upon dimensionality, and those laws provide many of the pre-existing conditions necessary for intelligent life.

Moreover, certain physical constants in the universe must be exactly as they are to permit life, namely, the four fundamental forces of gravity, the weak force, the strong force, and electromagnetism (“Teleological Argument”).  There is no scientifically necessary reason why these forces have these specific constants assigned to them rather than other constants; they simply happen to possess values such that life is permitted.  For example, if the constant of the strong force were increased by a mere 1%, nuclear resonance levels would be so altered nearly all carbon would be burned into oxygen (“Teleological Argument”).  Changes in electromagnetism by a sheer one part in 10^40 would result in the inability of stars like our sun to develop (“Teleological Argument”).  Examples of fine-tuning in this area are too numerous to count, including the ratio between the mass of protons and that of neutrons, the cosmological constant (the amount of dark energy in the universe), and the density of the universe (“Teleological Argument”).  Even the rate at which the universe expands is exquisitely fine-tuned such that if altered in the slightest degree, it would make intelligent life impossible (“Teleological Argument”).

A possible objection to this argument would be to assert that although fine-tuning is required for the existence of intelligent human life, perhaps, given any number of different sets of physical constants and arbitrary quantities, different forms of life might have arisen.  While it is true we may be able to imagine life in other possible universes, we can’t imagine life in just any other possible universe.  The concept of life is, by its very nature, complex.  Everything that is alive must die at some point in the finite future, and thus, the conditions necessary for survival of a particular life form must be fine-tuned.  In a world in which there were an extremely high amount of universes, the complex nature of life demands the set of life-permitting universes be extremely small.  Thus, we can conclude that any universe which would permit life would still possess significant fine-tuning due to the vast improbability of its occurrence.  It cannot be reasonably denied these are examples of apparent design left untouched by Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig proposes three possible explanations for this “wider teleology” of the universe: physical necessity, chance, or design.

One possible explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe is what Craig refers to as physical necessity, the idea the universe must necessarily be life-permitting due to a sort of “theory of everything” that would unify the various physical constants.  Surely, on its face, this alternative seems highly implausible.  One can imagine all sorts of possible universes in which the initial conditions were slightly modified as to prohibit the existence of intelligent human life.  Not only is there no evidence for this explanation, but we have good reason to reject it as well.

Included in the fine-tuning of the universe are certain arbitrary quantities in addition to the aforementioned physical constants not governed by any physical law.  That is to say, even if the laws of physics were other than what they are, these quantities would not be affected.  These quantities are in fact simply “put in” as boundary conditions upon which the physical laws of nature operate.  For example, we have the amount of entropy, or the measurement of “disorder” in the universe, as well as its density and initial speed of expansion (“Teleological Argument”).  Even if there were a sort of “theory of everything” which was able to unify the various laws of nature into one explanation, the need for the fine-tuning with respect to these fundamental arbitrary quantities would remain (“Teleological Argument”).

Even still, any “theory of everything” with the complex ability to unite the physical constants could itself be seen as a supreme instance of fine-tuning (“Teleological Argument”).  For example, the most plausible candidate for such a unified theory is known as string theory, which postulates all of nature is reducible to tiny, vibrating strings.  However, scientists have concluded this theory can only work in a world composed of exactly eleven dimensions (“Teleological Argument Pt. 2”).  Thus, although string theory explains certain instances of fine-tuning, by invoking it we automatically incur a need for a new kind of geometrical fine-tuning.  Therefore, the idea of the universe’s fine-tuning being explained by physical necessity is not only implausible on its face but also severely lacking in support from scientific evidence.

A second possible and perhaps more common explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe is that of chance.  This view posits the various constants and quantities in the universe simply happen by sheer accident to be within the infinitesimally microscopic range of permitting life.  Initially, the problem with this is the odds against a life-permitting universe forming by chance alone are so incomprehensibly great they cannot be reasonably faced.  While it is true anything is possible, the philosopher ought to be concerned not with possibility but with reasonability; we ought to determine what is the most reasonable inference from the evidence.

Furthermore, this problem cannot be overcome by the atheist who claims improbabilities happen.  While this is certainly true, there is a factor at play here beyond sheer improbability that makes the chance explanation so implausible.  The universe’s fine tuning does not only possess improbability, but specified improbability.  It conforms to an independently given pattern, namely, that which permits the existence of intelligent human life (“Teleological Argument Pt. 1”).

To illustrate, imagine finding a chimpanzee typing away at a computer.  Upon approaching further, you find mere gibberish on the screen and rightly do not conclude the random string of letters is the result of any sort of intelligent design.  Suppose, however, upon entering you found the chimp was actually typing out one of Shakespeare’s sonnets.  At that point you would be reasonable to conclude there was some sort of intelligence involved, even though the two strings of letters produced were equally as improbable (“Teleological Argument Pt. 2”).  The difference lies in whether an improbability is specified, and in the case of the universe, the fact intelligent life is permitted entails specificity.  In other words, our universe isn’t just any old universe; rather, it is one that allows for intelligent human life.

One way the atheist could surmount this difficulty is with what is known as the anthropic principle, which posits we ought to not be surprised to observe a life-permitting universe, since if the universe were not finely tuned, we would not be here to be surprised about it (“Teleological Argument Pt. 2”).  While it is true we should not be surprised not to observe conditions which are incompatible with our existence, it would be a leap of logic to then assert we ought not to be surprised to observe conditions which are compatible with our existence.  The statement simply does not follow logically.

To illustrate, consider a second scenario in which one is brought before a group of 100 trained marksmen who each aim to shoot him.  If each one missed, he would not be justified in saying “I guess I shouldn’t be surprised to be alive!  After all, if I had been shot, I wouldn’t be here to be surprised!” (“Teleological Argument Pt. 3”).  Rather, a proper response would entail surprise at the fact of the enormous improbability of each of the marksmen missing their target.  Such is the case with the universe.  We are justified in being surprised at our own existence because of the vast improbability of a life-permitting universe.

However, an emerging metaphysical hypothesis has added a twist to the analogy of the trained marksmen in an effort to refute the theory of design.  Imagine that same scenario, only with the addition when one opens his eyes to see he is alive, he discovers there are 100 other people lying dead around him.  He is no longer surprised to see himself alive, he simply considers himself lucky to have been the one who, by chance alone, was not shot (“Teleological Argument Pt. 3”).  This is what is being propounded by what many call the theory of “the world ensemble” or the multiverse.  The idea is by positing an extremely high or infinite number of universes, by chance alone there would happen to be a universe that would “survive the shooting of the marksmen” and overcome the vast improbability to permit intelligent life.  However, there are three key reasons why the theory of the multiverse is unsuccessful in removing the need for a designer.

If we apply here the methodological principle known as Ockham’s razor, which states causes ought not to be posited beyond necessity, the design theory is a better explanation because it is simpler.  It seems a more reasonable reaction to attribute fine-tuning to a fine-tuner, rather than mere chance.  To posit an infinite number of universes simply in an effort to explain away the fine-tuning of our particular universe rather than simply choose belief in God is to posit a more complex cause than is necessary.

One would never make this sort of inference to chance in daily life.  If while walking alone the beach, one found a watch in the sand, he would be much more likely to attribute it to some sort of intelligence than to shout, “I shouldn’t be surprised to find this!  After all, in this infinite multiverse of ours, there’s bound to be some universe in which this watch assembles through natural processes!”  Clearly, the design hypothesis is a better explanation when judging on the criterion of simplicity propounded by Ockham’s razor.

In response to this, the atheist may point out the idea of a maximally great being entails great complexity.  While it is true that God, if he exists, is certainly a complex sort of being, that is very different from stating he is a complex explanation.  For example, in the scenario of finding a watch, it would be a simpler explanation to attribute it to a human rather than mere chance, even though the actual human being is extremely complex.

In addition, positing a multiverse as an explanation for fine-tuning does not advance our understanding of the world and our place within it the same way the design hypothesis does.  We cannot understand much more about our universe by simply asserting it to be the product of mere chance in a world ensemble of universes.  However, the design hypothesis could reveal to us great understanding about the meaning and purpose of our universe.

Secondly, there is simply no empirical evidence for the multiverse theory.  It is no more “scientific” than the design theory (“Teleological Argument Pt. 3”).  In fact, it is not even the sort of thing that could ever possibly be empirically proven.  Science, for all its capabilities, simply by definition cannot reach beyond the boundaries of our universe.  However, a key difference between the two theories lies in the fact while there is independent evidence for the existence of a divine designer, such as the cosmological and ontological arguments, there is nothing but sheer guesswork to support the existence of the multiverse.  Again, it is the task of the philosopher not to confuse himself with every possible explanation, but to determine what is the most reasonable inference.  From a strictly evidential point of view, the design hypothesis is a better explanation.

Finally, even if the existence of the multiverse could somehow be proven, it still would not alleviate the need for a fine-tuner.  One of the most compelling examples of this “wider teleology” sort of fine-tuning is the constant for the rate of expansion of matter (“Teleological Argument”), which would still be in play even given a multiverse.  Thus, attempts to explain the multiverse do not get rid of fine-tuning, they merely push it further back.

After ruling out the possible explanations of physical necessity and chance to explain the fine-tuning of the universe, there is only one option left: design.  One may not always be pleased with where the evidence leads, but in order to maintain intellectual honesty, he must follow it.  The sheer complexity and intricacy of the physical constants and arbitrary quantities of our universe cry out for an explanation that atheism cannot reasonably satisfy.  We must go where the evidence leads us, therefore, and conclude that belief in the existence of God is justified by this argument.

Works Cited

Craig, Dr. William Lane. “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle”. Leader.com. N.p., 8 November 2005. Web. 11 October 2012.

—. “The Teleological Argument (Pt. 1).” The Defenders Podcast. 23 September 2007. Reasonable Faith. 11 October 2012.

—. “The Teleological Argument (Pt. 2).” The Defenders Podcast. 1 October 2007. Reasonable Faith. 1 October 2012.

—. “The Teleological Argument (Pt. 3).” The Defenders Podcast. 8 October 2007. Reasonable Faith. 11 October 2012.

Lennox, James. “Darwin Was a Teleologist.” Faculty.arts.ubc.ca. N.p, N.d. Web. 11 October 2012.

Oakes, Edward. “Briefly Noted 56.” Firstthings.com. N.p., October 2003. Web. 11 October 2012.